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Donee Payment of Gift Tax: Crane, Old Colony Trust, and the 
Need for Congressional Action 
Section 2501 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) imposes a 
tax on ''the transfer of property by gift,"1 and section 2502(c) obli-
gates donors to pay the tax.2 Most donors satisfy this obligation with 
income, savings, or proceeds from the sale of property that would 
have been given to the donee if gifts were untaxed. Some donors, 
however, are unwilling or unable to pay gift taxes,3 and the tax bur-
den then falls on the donee.4 Whether donors realize taxable gain5 
when their donees pay gift taxes has troubled tax planners for several 
years . 
.Diedrich v. Commissioner,6 on which the Supreme Court has al-
ready heard oral arguments,7 squarely presents this issue. Relying 
on Crane v. Commissioner8 and Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commis-
1. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(I}. The Code does not define the term "gift." See Hauser, Gift, Income 
or What?, 15 ARK. L. REv. 294, 294 (1961) (''The definition of gifts has • . . been left to the 
courts."). The courts have defined this term differently for income tax and gift tax purposes, 
See Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Com.missioner, 160 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1947); Com.missioner v. 
Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243,246 (2d Cir. 1942). For income tax purposes, a "gift" is excludable 
from the donee's gross income under I.R.C. § 102 only if the donor gives with "detached and 
disinterested generosity." Com.missioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960). For gift tax , 
purposes, "(T]here must be a cessation of the transferor's dominion and control over the item 
or items which comprise the subject matter of the transfer." Estate of Mandels v. Commis-
sioner, 64 T.C. 61, 67 (1975) (citations omitted); Weil v. Com.missioner, 31 B.T.A. 899, 906 
(1934), ajfd., 82 F.2d 561 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 552 (1936); Ross v. Com.missioner, 28 
B.T.A. 39, 43, appeal dismissed, 67 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1933). 
2. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 442(a)(2), 95 Stat. 172, 320 
(codified at I.R.C. § 2502(c)). I.R.C. § 2502(c) states: "[T]he tax imposed by section 2501 shall 
be paid by the donor." 
3. Comment, Tlte Tax Consequences of Net Gifts, 48 TENN. L. REv. 404, 404-05 (1981) 
(citing Faber, Gift Tax Planning: Tlte New Valuation Tables; Net Gifts; Political Gifts; and Other 
Problems, 31 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1217, 1234-35 (1973), and Kopp, Gifts Subject lo .Donee 
Payment of Tax: Timing, Risks and Computations, 21 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 375, 375-76 
(1969)), lists several reasons why donors may refuse to pay gift taxes: (1) "insufficiency of cash 
or other liquid assets"; (2) "inability or unwillingness to liquidate property to produce the 
necessary cash"; (3) a desire "to limit the value of the gift"; (4) a desire ''to shift the realized 
gain on the sale of appreciated gift property to a donee in a lower marginal income tax brack-
et"; and (5) a desire to give the donee experience in financial matters. See Suwalsky, Net Gifts 
-A Critical Look at Johnson v. Com.missioner, 75-5 TAX MNGMT. (BNA) 2, 5-6 (1975). 
4. See I.R.C. §§ 6324(b), 6901(a)(l)(A)(ili); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6324-l(b), 301.6324-l(d). 
5. Under I.R.C. § IOOl(a), gain from the sale or other disposition of property is the excess 
of the amount realized over the adjusted basis in the property. I.R.C. § IOOl(b) states that the 
amount realized is ''the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property 
(other than money) received." The adjusted basis in property is computed under I.R.C. § 1016. 
6. 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 (1981) (No. 80-2204). 
7. The Court heard oral arguments on February 24, 1982. For a summary of the argu-
ments, see 1982 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) G-2 (Feb. 26, 1982). 
8. 331 U.S. 1 (1947) (basis in property is not reduced by nomecourse indebtedness, and 
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sioner ,9 the Eighth Circuit held that a donor whose donee paid the 
gift tax realized gain to the extent that the tax payment exceeded the 
donor's adjusted basis in the transferred property. 10 Underlying this 
holding was the court's belief that the transaction was in part a sale 
and in part a gift. 11 Viewing the gift tax payment as consideration 
received by the donor, one can find the elements of a sale. After that 
payment has been subtracted from the value of the property trans-
ferred, however, there remains a pure gift. 
Among the courts of appeals, only the Eighth Circuit has 
adopted the part-sale, part-gift theory. Most of the courts that have 
addressed this issue have applied the net gift theory12 and held that 
upon sale of the property, the amount realized includes the amount of indebtedness from 
which the seller is relieved). 
9. 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
10. 643 F.2d at 504. There was much support for the Eighth Circuit's position in the legal 
literature. See, e.g., Del Cotto, Sales and Other .Dispositions of Property Under Section 1001: 
The Taxable Event, Amount Realized and Related Problems of Basis, 26 BUFFALO L. RE.v. 223, 
305-17 (1977); Ward, Taxation of Gratuitous Transfers of Encumbered Property: Partial Sales 
and Section 677/a}, 63 loWA L. RE.v. 823, 860-66 (1978) (apply part-sale, part-gift when trust 
pays gift tax); Note, Federal Income Tax - Net Gfft .Doctrine - No Taxable Income Results 
from Gf/t Given Subject to Condition That .Donee Pay Gfft Tax, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1074 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Cornell Note]; Note, Income Tax Consequences of Encumbered 
Gffts: The Advent of Crane, 28 U. FLA. L. RE.v. 935, 945 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Florida 
Note]; Note, Tax Consequences of Funding Trusts with Encumbered Property: The .Demise of 
Section 677, 28 U. FLA. L. RE.v. 708, 722 (1976) (suggesting part-sale, part-gift theory should 
be applied when trust pays gift tax) [hereinafter cited as Section 677 Note]; Note, Bad News far 
Net Givers: .Donee Payment of Gfft Taxes Results in Taxable Income to .Donor, 36 U. PITI. L. 
RE.v. 517 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Pittsburgh Note]; Comment, Federal Income Tax -In-
come Taxation of Net Gffts After Hirst v. Commissioner, 32 RUTGERS L. RE.v. 389 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Rutgers Comment]; Comment, Assumption of Indebtedness by a .Donee: 
Income Tax Consequences, 17 STAN. L. REV. 98, 98-99 (1964) [hereinafter cite~ as Stanford 
Comment]; Note, Taxation - Conditional Net Gfft Transfers: No Income Tax Consequences to 
.Donor - Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978), 52 TEMPLE L.Q. 139 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Temple Note]. , 
11. The term "part-gift and part-sale" is a judicial creation used to describe the federal 
income tax consequences of a transaction where the donor transfers property in return for 
consideration less than the fair market value of the property. The donor is viewed as 
having a dual intent: first, he is seen as having the intent to give a gift in the amount by 
which the value of the property exceeds the value of the consideration; second, he is seen 
as entering the transaction with the intent of deriving economic benefit from the consider-
ation received, namely, the payment of his gift tax liability. 
Owen v. Commissioner, 652 F.2d Adv. Sh. 1271, 1274 n.6 (6th Cir. 1981) (2-1) (case vacated 
Sept 11, 1981, and ordered held in abeyance pending the disposition of Diedrich v. Commis-
sioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 (No. 80-2204)) (citation omitted). 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.1001-l(e) (1972) states: "[W]here a transfer of property is in part a sale and 
in part a gift, the transferor has a gain to the extent that the amount realized by him exceeds 
his adjusted basis in the property." 
The Commissioner developed the part-sale, nart-gift theory because he was unsuccessful in 
taxing gain to trust settlers under I.R.C. § 677(a) when trustees discharged the gift tax liability. 
For a review of those cases, see, Rutgers Comment, supra note 10, at 392 n.24; Comment, supra 
note 3, at 409-11. 
12. "A net gift is a gratuitous transfer of property in which the donor transfers property to 
the donee conditioned upon the donee's agreement to pay the applicable gift tax resulting from 
the transfer." Comment, supra note 3, at 404 ( citations omitted); see Suwalsky, supra note 3, at 
2 ("a gift of property subject to some encumbrance or obligation which may be either preexist-
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the donor does not have taxable income.13 Under the net gift theory, 
gifts are measured by subtracting the donee's gift tax payment frolll 
the value of the property that he received. If the donor intended td 
convey a gift, possible benefits to him from the donee's tax payment 
are overlooked. 14 
Neither of these approaches, this Note argues, is consistent with 
both the Code and the broad policies underlying Congress' treat-
ment of donative transactions. The net gift theory achieves results 
that comport with congressional policy, but its focus on donative in-
. tent finds little support in the Code. The part-sale, part-gift theory 
undermines Congress' policy toward gifts, but follows logically from 
the Supreme Court's decision in Old Colony Trust. The Note con-
cludes, therefore, that Congress should amend the Code to make 
clear that liability for gift taxes is shared by donors and donees. By 
ensuring that donee payments of gift taxes would riot constitute taxa-
ble gain to donors, this amendment would eliminate the inconsis-
tency between Congress' goals and its operative language. 
ing or which arises at the time of the gift" (footnotes omitted)); Florida Note, supra note 10, at 
941~ Recent Decisions, Income Taxation of Net G(fts - Hirst v. Commissioner, 38 Mo. L. REV. 
llO, llO (1978) [hereinafter cited as Maryland Note]. 
The net gift concept first developed in litigation over the gift tax consequence of having the 
donee pay the gift tax. The issue that had to be resolved was whether the gift tax was to be 
computed against the value of the property originally transferred from the donor to the donee 
- without regard to donee's payment of the gift tax - or whether the tax would be computed 
against the net exchange - the value of the property transferred from the donor to the donee 
less the donee's gift tax payment. The courts, reasoning that donor intended a gift equalling 
the value of the property transferred less the gift tax payment, held that the gift tax was to be 
computed against this "net gift." Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952), acq. 1952-2 
C.B. 2; Lingo v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1954). 
13. Owen v. Commissioner, 652 F.2d Adv. Sh. 1271 (6th Cir. 1981) (decided on stare deci-
sis grounds) (case vacated Sept. 11, 1981, and ordered held in abeyance pending the disposi-
tion of Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 (1981) 
(No. 80-2204)); Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307 (1974), qlfd., 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) 
(en bane); Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363 (1971), qlfd. per ct1riam, 
469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972); Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968), qlfd. per curiam, 410 
F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969). 
The Tax Court has followed these circuit courts. See Estate of Weeden v. Co=issioner, 
39 T.C.M. (CCH) 699 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-7127 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 1980); Benson v. 
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 989 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1032 (6th Cir. Jan 22, 
1979); Bradford v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 584 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1094 (6th Cir. 
Feb. 13, 1979); Estate of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-
1340 (6th Cir. July 31, 1978); Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971). But the Tax 
Court's support has been less than enthusiastic: "In substance a portion of the transferred 
property equal in value to the amount of the gift tax is not treated as having been part of the 
gift. But surely that portion did not vanish into thin air ..•. " Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 
T.C. 307, 315 (1974), qlfd. per curiam, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (en bane). 
14. See Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (en bane); Turner v. Commis-
sioner, 49 T.C. 356, 363 (1968), qlfd. per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969). 
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I. THE NET GIFT AND PART-SALE, PART-GIFT THEORIES 
A. The Net G!ft Theory 
1131 
Net gift theorists look solely at the donor's intent to determine 
whether a donee's gift tax payments are income to his donor. When 
a donor intends to make a gift, the Tax Court has reasoned, he does 
not intend to sell anything. 15 A donee's satisfaction of his donor's 
gift tax liability does not alter the overall nature of a donative trans-
action.16 In Hirst v. Commissioner, 17 the Fourth Circuit adopted the 
Tax Court's approach and held that no taxable benefit accrued to the 
donor: 
The predominant circumstance here is that this taxpayer did not intend 
to sell anything; she intended only to give her property to her progeny. 
She did not receiye anything for herself; there was no economic gain of 
any kind accruing to her, except release from the normal tax burden of an 
owner of real estate. 1_8 
This conclusion, however, ignores both the language of the Code 
and economic reality. · 
At the most basic level, the net gift theory fails to explain why a 
donor's subjective intent should determine the income tax conse-
quences of his actions. Taxpayers' subjective intent, one must con-
cede, has little evidential value: Most taxpayers will claim to have 
intended the course of action that minimizes their tax liability, and 
neither the Internal Revenue Service nor the Supreme Court has de-
vised a foolproof method for rebutting these claims. The Court has 
thus concluded: "[T]he donor's characterization of his action is not 
determinative . . . . It scarcely needs adding that the parties' expec-
tations or hopes as to the tax treatment of their conduct in them-
selves have nothing to do with the matter."19 
The net gift theory also fails to recognize that a disposition of 
property can exhibit elements of both a sale and a gift. A donor's 
intent ''to give her property to her progeny'' is not evidence that she 
15. See Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968), qffd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th 
Cir. 1969). In Turner, the donor transferred appreciated stock to nine donees. Three of these 
gifts were made directly to the recipients while the other six gifts were made to trust accounts. 
Each individual recipient and trustee signed a letter agreeing to pay the resulting gift tax as a 
condition for receiving the gift. 
The Turner court's intent argument has been perceived as the crux of its decision. See, e.g., 
Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427,430 (4th Cir. 1978) (en bane); Florida Note, supra note 
10, at 943; Comment, supra note 3, at 413. 
16. Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. at 362 (1968), qffd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 
1969) ("[A) condition imposed by the transferor-that the transferee will pay the gift tax result-
ing therefrom does not alter the result that the transfer constituted a gift."). 
17. 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (en bane). The Fourth Circuit originally decided Hirst for 
the government on the part-sale, part-gift theory. See 572 F.2d at 434 (Winter and Butzner, 
JJ., dissenting). On rehearing en bane, the court reversed its position. · 
18. 572 F.2d at 430 (emphasis added). 
19. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960). 
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received nothing for herself. Section 2502(c) of the Code imposes a 
tax on persons who make gifts. Some donors, however, induce their 
donees to pay this tax by conditioning the transfer on the donee's 
payment of the gift tax.20 Despite the donative nature of the overall 
transaction, this bargained-for discharge of the donor's tax liability 
may constitute taxable gain.21 
Finally, because net gift theorists emphasize only the donor's in-
tent, they often overlook the economic effects of a donee's agreement 
to pay gift taxes.22 Donors are unlikely to condition gifts on their 
donees' payment of gift taxes unless they believe that their action 
will produce tax savings to the family or other unit.23 Donees are 
typically less wealthy than donors; if part of the property must be 
sold to pay the gift tax, and the donee is in a lower tax bracket than 
the donor, a net gift will reduce the unit's total tax liability.24 Alter-
natively, the donee, but not the donor, may have access to sufficient 
20. See, e.g., Bradford v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 584, 589 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-
1094 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 1979); Estate of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665, 666-67 (1978), 
appeal docketed, No. 78-1340 (6th Cir. July 31, 1978); Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 30 
T.C;M. (CCH) 1363, 1364-66 (1971), ojfd. per curiom, 469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972); Turner v. 
Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356, 358 (1968), ojfd. per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969). 
21. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929). The applicabil-
ity of Old Colony Trust to the net gift situation is discussed in Part IC infto. 
Under§ IOOI(a), gain on a sale or other disposition of property is the excess of the amount 
realized over the adjusted basis of the transferred property. I.R.C. § IOOI(a). The amount 
realized includes ''the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property 
(other than money) received." I.R.C. § IOOl(b). Any amount realized must be recognized 
unless the Code provides for nomecognition. I.R.C. §IOOl(c). Since no provision authorizes 
nomecognition when a donee pays the gift tax, donors must recognize any gain that they 
realize. 
22. See, e.g., Diedrich v. Commissioner 643 F.2d 499,504 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. 
Ct 89 (1981) (No. 80-2204); Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974); 
Temple Note, supra note 10, at 151; Tennessee Note, supra note 3, at 424-29; Rutgers Com-
ment, supra note 10, at 406-11. 
23. Congress generally treats the donor and donee as a single unit for tax purposes. See 
text at notes 53-55 infto. 
24. One could argue that the analysis of the taxable unit's tax liability does not properly 
include an examination of income taxes. The amount of the gift tax paid on the transfer is the 
same regardless of which party pays the tax. The only benefit to the unit is income tax savings 
that result from having the donee pay the gift tax. But Congress has expressly sanctioned 
donees' paying income taxes at their own lower tax rate on gain that accrues while in the hands 
of the donor. See notes 53-55 infta and accompanying text. That the donees use these pro-
ceeds to pay the gift tax should therefore be irrelevant when measuring benefit to the taxable 
unit The proper inquiry, therefore, is whether the government receives less in gift tax pro-
ceeds; since the gift tax payment is the same, there is no benefit to the unit from having the 
donee pay the gift tax. 
This argument, while appealing at first blush, is unpersuasive. Congress does tax gain that 
accrues in the donor's hands at the donee's tax rate when the donee sells the appreciated prop-
erty, but it does so because the code provisions governing the transfer, §§ 102 and 1015, make 
the underlying transfer a nontaxable event (for income tax purposes). The provision in ques-
tion here, § 2502( c), forces realization because it imposes an obligation that must be satisfied at 
the time of the transfer. Satisfaction of that obligation neccessarily diverts resources that could 
be used for other purposes. Those resources, in turn, must be earned, and an income tax must 
be paid on those earnings. The proper inquiry includes an examination of both the income tax 
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funds to pay the tax without selling the property; a net gift would 
enable the unit to defer recognition of gain until the donee_ disposed 
of the property in a taxable transaction. 
B. The Part-Sale, Part-G!ft Theory and the Crane Doctrine 
The part-sale, part-gift theory recognizes the multidimensional 
nature of some donative transactions. Courts adopting this theory 
argue that both parties benefit from a gift conditioned on the donee's 
payment of the gift tax. The benefit to the donee is clear, but non-
taxable if the donor has satisfied the requirements of section 102.25 
The benefit, if one exists, to the donor lies in _the discharge of the 
obligation imposed on him by section 2502(c).26 In Diedrich,27 the 
Eighth Circuit relied in part on the principle established in Crane v. 
Commissioner28 to hold that such a discharge conferred a taxable 
benefit on the donor.29 This Section establishes that the analogy to 
and gift tax consequences of having the donee pay the gift tax, for to limit the inquiry to the 
gift tax would ignore the donor's principal motivation for having the donee pay the gift tax. 
This analysis is proper regardless of the source of money used to satisfy the gift tax because 
the benefit to the unit results from the difference in the tax rates of the donor and donee, not 
from how the money is raised to pay the gift tax. 
25. I.R.C. § 102(a) states that a donee's "gross income does not include property acquired 
by gift." 
26. See Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499, 501 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 
(1981) ("the payment of federal gift taxes is the legal responsibility of the donor'') (footnote 
omitted); Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d at 438 (Thomsen, J., dissenting) (''taxpayer was 
primarily responsible for the payment of those gift taxes"); Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 
634 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1980) (dictum) ("the gift tax ..• is a personal liability of the donor''). 
27. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 (1981) 
28. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). 
29. A pure net gift situation exists where the donee pays the gift tax for the donor. The iwo 
cases before Diedrich that applied the part-sale, part-gift theory involved pre-existing encum-
brances. See Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Com-
missioner, 59 T.C. 791 (1973), qffd., 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974). 
The Diedrich court found that the lack of a pre-existing encumbrance did not distinguish the 
case before it from Johnson and Estate of Levine and held for the Commissioner based on 
those two cases. 643 F.2d at 503-04. 
In Johnson, three taxpayers took out nomecourse loans against highly appreciated stock 
and transferred the encumbered stock to a trust set up for their children's benefit. The trustees 
replaced the taxpayers' notes with their own notes, again pledging the stock as collateral. This 
gave the taxpayers the loan proceeds free from any obligation to repay the loan. The taxpayers 
used part of the loan proceeds to pay their gift taxes. 495 F.2d at 1080. They conceded that 
the money not used to pay the gift taxes was income to them, but argued that the money used 
to pay gift taxes was not income to them under the Turner net gift theory. 495 F.2d at 1081. 
The Sixth Circuit, while rejecting the part-sale, part-gift label, 495 F.2d at 1082 n.6, held 
against the taxpayers because the transfer of stock had produced an economic benefit to them 
equal to the amount of the loan proceeds. 495 F.2d at 1083. The court went on to state that 
the receipt of the loan proceeds used to pay the gift tax could be viewed as payment of the 
taxpayers' obligation by the trusts and thus constituted income to the donors-taxpayers under 
Old Colony Trust. Alternatively, the transfer could be viewed as a shedding of a debt by 
transferring the encumbered stock, and therefore income under Crane. 495 F.2d at 1083. 
Moreover, the court limited Turner: "[T]he Turner case does not support the taxpayers' posi-
tion. Turner has no precedential value beyond its peculiar fact situation, in view of the Com-
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Crane is imperfect and that the Crane doctrine does not justify the 
Eighth Circuit's conclusion. 
The Supreme Court held in Crane that the basis of inherited 
property could not be reduced by the amount of nonrecourse indebt-
edness30 and that the amount realized on a sale of encumbered prop-
erty includes the remaining indebtedness.31 Release from 
nonrecourse indebtedness, the Crane Court argued, gives the seller 
an economic benefit "as real and substantial as if the mortgage was 
discharged or as if a personal debt in an equivalent amount had been 
assumed by another."32 Once basis is not reduced by nonrecourse 
indebtedness, the Court added, "the functional relation[ship]" be-
tween the Code's basis and the amount realized provisions requires 
that such indebtedness also be included in the amount realized on a 
disposition of the property.33 "If the indebtedness were included only 
in basis, taxpayers could offset income tax liability by depreciating 
property purchased with borrowed funds, sell the property subject to 
missioner's concessions in that case both in the Tax Court and on appeal to this Court." 495 
F.2d at 1086. 
In Estate of Levine, the taxpayer made gifts of real estate in trust for three grandchildren in 
return for the trustee's assumption of mortgage and interest payments on nonrecourse loans 
against the property. The trustee also assumed the obligation to pay certain operating ex-
penses previously incurred by the donor. 634 F.2d at 13. The Commissioner contended that 
the donor owed income taxes on the amount by which the assumed liabilities exceeded the 
donor's adjusted basis in the transferred property. Judge Friendly held for the Commissioner, 
finding that the trustee's assumption of the donor's personal obligations provided the requisite 
"'sale' element" to allow the transaction to be governed by Crane. 634 F.2d at 16. 
Although Judge Friendly agreed with the Johnson decision and the Hirst dissent, he re-
served judgment on whether Crane applies when property is donated subject to a nonrecourse 
debt and there is no "'sale' element." 634 F.2d at 17. 
30. 331 U.S. at 11. 
31. 331 U.S. at 13 ("amount of the mortgage is properly included in the 'amount realized' 
on the sale"). 
32. 331 U.S. at 14 
33. 331 U.S. at 12 ("[T]he functional relation of the two sections [the basis and the amount 
realized sections] requires that the word ['property'] mean the same in one section that it does 
in the other."). See Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Amount Realized: The Demise of Crane's 
Footnote 37, SO OR. L. REv. 3, 9-10 (1980). In a purchase money mortgage situation like that 
in Crane, depreciation deductions are an important tie between the two sections. The Court 
acknowledged that "[t]he crux of this case, really, is whether the law permits her [Mrs. Crane] 
to exclude allowable deductions from consideration in computing gain." 331 U.S. at 15 (foot-
note omitted). See Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An Imagl• 
nary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REv. 159, 169-70 (1966); Bittker, Tax Shelters, 
Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Code, 33 TAX L. REv. 277,282 (1978) ("the tax consequences 
of the taxpayer's dealings with her property [are brought] into harmony with economic reality 
by recapturing her depreciation deductions to the extent that they exceed her investment"); 
Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects in 
Mortgage Financing, 18 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 74 (1969) ("The controlling force behind the 
Court's decision in Crane was probably its concern for depreciation policy."). . 
For a discussion of the relationship between basis, debt, and depreciation, see Rubin, How 
Mortgages Affect Basis: The Rules Are in Accord with Economic Reality, 13 J. TAX. 38 (1960); 
Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Basis: Mrs. Crane, Where Are You Now?, 53 S. CAL. L. Rev. 
1 (1979). 
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the encumbrance, and never be forced to account for the proceeds of 
the loan. 
Most commentators agree that the rationale underlying Crane 
applies in two situations.34 Transferors of property realize gain 
when they take out nonrecourse loans against the property's appreci-
ated value and then transfer the property subject to the indebted-
ness.35 Transferors also realize gain when they acquire property 
with a purchase money mortgage and then dispose of the property 
after taking depreciation deductions in excess of their cash invest-
ment. 36 These situations share one characteristic: the transfer elimi-
nates a pre-existing indebtedness and thus violates the premise -
that loans must be repaid - on which the transferor was granted tax 
immunity on the proceeds of the loan. 37 Although loan proceeds are 
not taxable, they do produce current economic benefits to borrowers. 
Crane's realization principle may thus be understood as seeking to 
ensure that transferors account for the tax-free benefits previously 
derived from borrowed funds.38 Viewed in this way, Crane does not 
34. See, e.g., Bacas, Gifts of Property Subject to Indebtedness: Johnson v. Commissioner, 44 
GEO.WASH. L. REv. 86, 110 (1975); Bittker, supra note 33, at 284; Del Cotto, supra note 33, at 
95. 
35. See, e.g., Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. 
Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974); First Natl. Indus. v. 
Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 608, 610, 616 (1967); Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 16 
T.C. 649 (1951), qffd., 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952); cf. Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 
106, 111, 113 (N.D. Miss. 1971), qffd., 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972) (donor has taxable gain 
when donee assumes mortgage taken out against appreciated value of property; Crane not 
applied). 
36. See, e.g., Evangelista v. Commissioner, 629 F.2d 1218, 1224-25 (7th Cir. 1980); Parker 
v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 459 (1st Cir. 1950); Guest v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 9, 24-25 (1981); 
Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320, 324 (1947); cf. Simon v. Commissioner, 285 
F.2d 422, 425 (3d Cir. 1960) (release from mortgage taxable gain to seller; Crane not applied). 
37. See, e.g., Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952); Mend-
ham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320, 323 (1947); Simmons, supra note 33, at 16. 
38. See, e.g., Bacas, supra note 34, at 110; Bittker, supra note 33, at 282-84; Simmons, supra 
note 33, at 4, 17. 
No less than five different theories have been offered to explain Crane. Professor Simmons 
argues that the Crane doctrine taxes borrowed funds that had previously escaped taxation 
because of the expectation that the funds would be invested in the property. Simmons, supra 
note 33, at 21, 34. Professor Bittker argues, in a slightly different vein, that Crane should be 
viewed as a balancing entry made at the time of the transfer to bring "the tax consequences of 
the taxpayer's dealings • . . into harmony with economic reality by recapturing depreciation 
deductions to the extent that they exceeded her investment in the encumbered property." Bitt-
ker, supra note 33, at 282; cf. Adams, supra note 33, at 169-70 (depreciation deductions must be 
accounted for). Professor Del Cotto offers an alternate interpretation: Crane only applies 
when the fair market value of the transferred property exceeds the amount of the indebtedness; 
when this is not the case, and the debt is nonrecourse, the transferor realizes gain under Crane 
up to the fair market value of the property and the remaining benefit to the taxpayer is taxed 
under the tax benefit rule. If the debt is personal, the discharge of indebtedness doctrine gov-
erns. Del Cotto, supra note 10, at 317-26. 
Bacas suggests that Crane is designeg to make the taxpayer account for past advantages of 
owning property, which was either acquired with borrowed funds or borrowed against after 
acquisition. Bacas, supra note 34, at 110-11. · 
Chief Judge Magruder, in a concurring opinion in Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 459-60 
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support the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that a donee's payment of 
the gift tax conferred a taxable benefit on the donor. 
The facts of Diedrich, typical of the gift tax cases, differ substan-
tially from the two paradigmatic applications of the Crane doctrine; 
no tax-free benefit had accrued to the donor prior to the transfer of 
property. A taxpayer who transfers property subject to a loan taken 
out against its appreciated value or subject to a purchase money 
mortgage has an obligation to repay the loan that predates the trans-
fer. A transfer removes this obligation, and the previously untaxed 
benefit becomes properly taxable under Crane. But a donor whose 
donee makes gift tax payments receives an economic benefit only 
after he makes the transfer, for only then does gift tax liability ac-
crue. Because no antecedent obligation is removed or previous tax-
free benefit enjoyed, the Crane doctrine, as generally interpreted,39 
does not apply when the donee pays the gift tax. 
C. The Part-Sale, Part-Gift Theory and Old Colony Trust 
The Eighth Circuit also drew support for its part-sale, part-gift 
theory from Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,40 where the 
Supreme Court considered whether a taxpayer received taxable in-
come when his employer paid his income tax pursuant to a corporate 
(1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951), suggests that these realization problems could 
be avoided if basis equalled equity, with depreciation deductions in excess of equity producing 
a negative basis. See Simmons, supra note 33, at 34-35 for criticism of the judge's suggestion. 
All but Judge Magruder's theory address the question of whether footnote 37 of Crane 
should limit the amount realized from a transfer. In footnote 37 the Court stated that the fair 
market value of the encumbered property could limit the amount realized: 
[I]fthe value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is 
not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a dif-
ferent problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the _property or 
transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot That is not this case. 
331 U.S. at 14 n.37. 
According to Professors Simmons and Bittker and Mr. Adams, the Crane Court's economic 
benefit argument does not adequately explain the tax consequences of transferring property 
subject to nonrecourse indebtedness. See Bittker, supra note 33, at 285 n.14 ("the economic 
benefit theory should be rejected as wholly fallacious"); Simmons, supra note 33, at 10 ("the 
Court was misled to believe that the value of encumbered property at the time of disposition 
was significant"); Adams, supra note 33, at 169-70. The Service has also repudiated footnote 
31. See Treas. Reg. § l,1001-2(b). This Note agrees with these authorities that footnote 37 
and the economic benefit theory do not adequately explain the tax consequences of transfers of 
encumbered property. 
39. See Bacas, supra note 34, at 110-1 I; Bittker, supra note 33, at 282-83; Simmons, supra 
note 33, at 21. Professor Del Cotto, however, argues that Crane applies when the donee pays 
the gift tax. According to Del Cotto, the donor slieds a "debt - the gift tax obligation - at the 
time of the transfer, receiving a debt cancellation benefit that is an amount realized under 
Crane. Del Cotto, supra note 10, at 313. Del Cotto's debt cancellation argument is tanta-
mount to an economic benefit analysis because it focuses on the amount of the liability at the 
time of transfer and limits the amount realized to the fair market value of the property. See id. 
at 296, 318, 322-23. This Note expressly rejects the economic benefit analysis and its footnote 
37 limitation because it fails to account for the previous economic benefits to the donor. See 
note 38 supra. 
40. 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
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resolution. The Court ruled out the possibility that the payment 
constituted a gift and held that relief of income tax liability should 
be treated as income. ''The discharge by a third person of an obliga-
tion to him," the Court argued, "is equivalent to receipt by the per-
son taxed."41 On its face, Old Colony Trust seems to require holding 
that a donor has taxable gain when his donee pays the gift tax,42 but 
several objections must be addressed before finalizing this 
conclusion. 
One could, for example, attempt to distinguish Old Colony Trust 
on the ground that the obligation to pay gift taxes is shared by do- · 
nors and donees, while taxpayers are solely responsible for their in-
come taxes. The gift tax is an "excise levied upon the donor's 
privilege of making transfers of property,"43 for which the donor is 
personally and primarily liable.44 Although donees become person-
ally liable for payment of the gift tax if their donors fail to pay when 
the tax comes due,45 this secondary liability does not amount to a 
shared obligation. The "special lien" created by section 6324(b) does 
41. 279 U.S. at 729. Accord, United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1937); cf. Minne-
sota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 612-13 (1937) (requiring a corporation to recognize 
gain on cash transferred to its shareholders in exchange for the shareholders' agreement to 
assume the corporation's debts where the cash transferred equalled the debts assumed); Doug-
las v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935) (holding that payments to a beneficiary from trust income 
were income to the settlor because the payments were in discharge of the settlor's legal obliga-
tion to make payments to the beneficiary). 
42. The commentators who favor the application of the part-sale, part-gift theory when the 
donee pays the gift tax disagree on whether the theory is based on Old Colony Trust, Crane, or 
both decisions. Most argue that both decisions are applicable. See, e.g., Del Cotto, supra note 
IO, at 310-13; Florida Note, supra note 10, at 944-47; Rutgers Comment, supra note 10, at 408 
n.136, 409-11; Temple Note, supra note 10, at 148-50; Comment, supra note 3, at 431. Two 
Notes suggest that Old Colony Trust alone is the proper basis for decision. Cornell Note, supra 
note IO, at 1081-82; Maryland Note, supra note 12, at 115-19 (discharge of debt). 
43. Kopp, supra note 3, at 375; cf. B. BITIKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, EsTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 990 (4th ed. 1972) ("estate tax is levied on the privilege of transmitting 
property at death, while an inheritance tax is on the privilege of receiving"); C. SttouP, PuBuc 
FINANCE 372 n.37 (1969) (comparing inheritance tax with estate tax). 
44. See I.R.C. §§ 2502(c), 6321 (imposing a lien on all of a taxpayer's personal property 
whenever a tax is not paid when due); Treas. Reg. § 25.2502-2 (1973); see also Mississippi 
Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 186, 187 (8th Cir. 1945); Baur v. Commissioner, 
145 F.2d 338, 339 (2d Cir. 1944); Fletcher Trust Co, v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 36, 39 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 711 (1944). 
45. I.R.C. § 6324(b) (''If the tax is not paid when due, the donee of any gift becomes per-
sonally liable for the tax to the extent of the value of his gift."); Treas. Reg.§ 301.6324-l(b) 
(1973); see Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 186, 187 (8th Cir. 1945); 
Baur v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 338, 339 (2d Cir. 1944); Fletcher Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 
141 F.2d 36, 39 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 711 (1944) (liability of donee is secondary). 
The only condition precedent to the donee's liability is the donor's failure to pay the gift 
tax. See Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d at 187-88. The donor's sol-
vency is immaterial, see Baur v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d at 340; Winton v. Reynolds, 57 F. 
Supp. 565, 567 (D. Minn. 1944), and the Commissioner need not first proceed against the 
donor, see Moore v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 14, 15 (1942), qffd., 146 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1945). 
One court has even held that the donee has no cause of action against the donor for reimburse-
ment. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Anthony, 13 NJ. Super. 596, 609, 81 A.2d 191, 198 (Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1951) ("mere making of a gift does not carry with it any implied promise by the 
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not create an indebtedness to the government;46 it "is merely a secur-
ity established by statute for the benefit of the taxing authority in the 
event of a default in payment of the tax."47 
One might also distinguish Old Colony Trust and .Diedrich based 
on how the tax obligations arose. In Old Colony Trust, the income 
tax liability arose from an exchange of services for money; "[t]he 
payment of the tax by the employers""was in consideration of the 
services rendered by the employee and was a gain derived by the 
employee from his labor."48 Even if the employer had not assumed 
responsibility for paying the employee's income tax, there was an 
exchange that produced income tax consequences. If the Old Colony 
Trust doctrine is applied in gift tax cases, it will create income tax 
consequences in an otherwise tax-free transfer. While one could ar-
gue that Old Colony Trust should not be extended to cases where 
there is no exchange of benefits· between the parties other than pay-
ment of the tax that arises from the initial transfer, this objection 
seems groundless. The Code expressly requires that the donor pay 
the gift tax, and the donees in cases like .Diedrich discharged that 
obligation ''upon a valuable consideration."49 
A final objection to applying Old Colony Trust is that donors do 
donor to pay the tax"), q/fd on other grounds sub nom. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Heller, 18 
NJ. Super. 49, 86 A.2d 594 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952) 
46. See 9 J. ·MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION§ 54.38, at 89 (rev. ed. 1977) 
( discussing liens generally). 
41. Id. at 90. 
This construction, which argues that § 6324 does not create an independent obligation but 
only provides a means for collecting the gift tax that is due from the donor, see Johnson v. 
Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1083 n.7 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974) ("Donee's 
liability is . . . in the nature of a lien rather than an alternative source of personal liability at 
the taxpayers' option, at least before the tax is actually due and payable); H.R. REP. No. 708, 
72d Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1932) ("By this section 
there is imposed a lien additional to that imposed by Section 3186 ...• "). But see Moore v. 
Commissioner, 146 F.2d824, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1945), which is consistent with the plain language 
of§ 2502(c) and with Congress' purpose, Comment, Intemal Revenue Code Section 6)24: Tlte 
Special Estate and Gift Tax Liens, 11 GoNZ. L. REv. 534, 534 (1976) ("Congress •.• enacted 
special liens ... to aid in the collection of ... gift taxes.") (citation omitted); cf. Detroit Bank 
v. United States, 317 U.S. 329,337 (1943) (per Stone, C.J.) ("in the case of the tax on property 
passing at death . . . there is greater need of a lien in advance of assessment and demand for 
payment of the tax than in the case of other types of taxes"). 
Section 6901(a)(l)(A)(iii) also creates no new obligation on the part of the donee, but facili-
tates collection of the gift tax. See Moore v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d at 825; 9 J. MERTENS, 
supra note 46, at § 53.01, at 3 n.10; id at § 53.05, at 9; Comment, Section 6901: Transferee 
Liability, 30 TAX LAW. 433, 434 (1977); c.f. United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 175, 177 (10th 
Cir. 1976) (applying the analogous provision for collection of estate taxes); United States v. 
58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 475, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (stockholder transferees 
liable for corporate taxes). 
Two other commentators have noted the question as to who has the obligation to pay the 
gift tax. Ward, supra note 10, at 859-61; Stanford Comment, supra note 10, at 104-05. Both 
argue that the donee's contingent liability is irrelevant because in the net gift and part-sale, 
part-gift cases, the donee pays the gift tax before it becomes due, ie., before he is personally 
liable for the tax. 
48. 279 U.S. at 729. 
49. 279 U.S. at 729. 
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not necessarily receive an economic benefit from their done.e's gift 
tax payments. It has already been demonstrated, however, that gifts 
conditioned on the donee's payment of the gift tax produce economic 
benefits to family or other units.50 These benefits, moreover, may 
not accrue solely to donees. Donors who are aware of the tax sav-
ings that donees in lower tax brackets realize when disposing of ap-
preciated property could, in effect, finance part of their gifts with 
these savings. A smaller conditional transfer could produce the 
same after-tax gift to the donee and thus the same level of satisfac-
tion to the donor while allowing the donor to conserve a larger share 
of his assets. · 
In conclusion, the Eighth Circuit's part-sale, part-gift tjieory is 
properly grounded in the Supreme Court's opinion in Old Colony 
Trust. Part II will argue, however, that the Court's theory is incon-
sistent with Congress' general approach to donative transfers. 
II. RECONCILING CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE CODE 
Although the sparse legislative record51 reveals some ambiva-
lence, Congress has traditionally tailored tax policy to encourage gift 
giving. 52 The net effect of most of Congress' policies toward gifts has 
50. See text at notes 22-24 supra. Congress generally treats the donor and donee as a 
single unit for tax purposes. See text at notes 53-55 infra. 
51. The problem with interpreting the congressional intent behind § 2502(c) is that the 
provision's wording has not changed since it was enacted in 1924. Accordingly, the legislative 
history on the provision is concentrated in the 1920s and 1930s. But that legislative history 
reveals little. The predecessor to § 2502(c) read: "Time of Payment - The tax imposed by 
section 319 shall be paid by the donor on or before the 15th day of March." Gift Tax Act of 
1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 324, 43 Stat. 253, 316 (1924). In 1932, when the gift tax was re-
enacted, the section imposing liability on the donor used most of the language of the 1924 
version. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 509(a), 47 Stat. 169, 253 (1932). The 
legislative history only stated that "[t]he tax is payable on or before the due date of the return." 
H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1932), reprinted in 1 LAW, REPoRTS, MlsCELLANY 
30 (Revenue Act of 1932) (Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law Li-
brary). During the 1939 codification the section number was changed, but the wording re-
mained the same. Internal Revenue Code, Pub. L. No. 76-1, § 1008(a), 53 Stat. 1, 148 (1939). 
In 1954, the section was changed to read: ''The tax imposed by section 2501 shall be paid by 
the donor." Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 2502(d), 68A Stat. 3, 404. 
Without discussion, the date of payment provision was moved to another subsection of§ 2502. 
See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 478, reprinted in [1954) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 4621, 5122 (''This section is derived from section ... 1008(a) of the 1939 code. No 
change in substance has been made."); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A321, re-
printed in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 4017, 4465 (same). In 1981, Congress moved 
the provision from I.R.C. § 2502(d) to I.R.C. § 2502(c), without explanation. See Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 442, 95 Stat. 172,320 (1981) (codified at I.R.C. 
§ 2502(c)). 
52. Since the reenactment of the gift tax in 1932, Gift Tax Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, 
§ 501-32, 47 Stat. 169, 245-59 (1932), gift giving has been given preferential treatment over the 
transfer of property at death, though this preference was reduced by the Tax Reform Act of 
1976. Before 1976, inter vivos gifts had five advantages over transferring property at death. 
First, gift tax rates were 75% of estate tax rates. Second, unlike estate taxes, the gift tax was not 
included in the tax base. See Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952), acq., 1952-2 
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been to treat the donor and donee as a single unit for tax purposes. 53 
Section 102, for example, excludes gifts from the donee's gross in-
come,54 and section 1015 requires the donee to assume the donor's 
basis in the transferred property.55· Section 2502(c)'s statement that 
the donor is to pay the gift tax is inconsistent with this single unit 
analysis, but it may not entirely reflect Congress' thinking on the 
subject. Congressmen have generally assumed that the donor would 
usually pay that tax;56 during the debates on the original gift tax, 
C.B. 2; Lingo v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1954). Third, because gift and estate 
taxes were computed on separate rate schedules, the total estate and gift tax bill could be 
reduced by splitting property transfers between inter vivos gifts and passing property at death. 
Fourth, the exemptions and multiple exclusions for gifts could be used without affecting the 
estate tax exemption. Fifth, income from gifts of property could be shifted from a taxpayer in 
a high income tax bracket to one in a lower tax bracket. For a discussion of these advantages, 
see JOINT COMMIITEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF 
1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 526-27, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 538-39; Eisenstein, The Rise and 
Decline oftlze Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REv. 223, 243-45 (1956); Harriss, Gifts During Life, in 
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFI' TAXES 174 (C. Shoup ed. 1966). 
These advantages were greatly reduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). The most important change was the replacement of the separate rate 
schedule with a unified rate schedule applied to both gifts and transfers at death. Tax Reform 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-455, §§ 2001, 2010, 2035, 2101, 2505, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-54 (1976) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the Code). 
53. Under the single unit analysis, the underlying transfer of property escapes taxation. 
See notes 54-55 infra. In essence, the donee steps into the shoes of the donor. The tax treat• 
ment reflects an attitude that gift giving is not a transaction that produces income, unlike 
transfers in the marketplace for goods, services, and capital, and therefore is not one that 
should be taxed. Most commentators disagree with this analysis. See, e.g., H. SIMONS, PER• 
SONAL INCOME TAXATION 127-45 (1938) (gift should be income to the donee because it in-
creases donee's wealth); Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and 
Bequests in Income, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1177 (1978); Klein, An Enigma in tlze Federal 
Income Tax: The Meaning of tlze Word Gift, 48 MINN. L. REv. 215, 215 (1963). But see R. 
GooDE, TuE INDMDUAL INCOME TAX 98-100 (rev. ed. 1976) (suggesting that gift giving 
should be viewed as the sharing of income among dependents and close relatives, not creation 
of new income). 
The repeal ofl.R.C. § 102 is unlikely. See Osgood, Carryover Basis Repeal and Reform of 
tlze Tranefer Tax System, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 297,299 (1981) ("Section 102 appears to have 
wide support and no serious attempts have been made in recent years to alter it.") (footnote 
omitted). 
54. I.R.C. § 102(a) states that "[g]ross income does not include the value of property ac• 
quired by gift." 
55. The donee assumes the donor's basis for computing gain on a subsequent sale of the 
property. I.R.C. § I015(a). The donee can reduce his basis while he holds the property. See 
I.R.C. §§ 1016(a), 1016(b). For computing losses on the sale of the property, the donce's basis 
is the lesser of the donor's basis and the fair market value of the property at the time of 
transfer. I.R.C. § 1015(a). This prevents a donor from giving a loss on property to a taxpayer 
who could better use the loss to avoid tax liability. See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 
27 (1934); s. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1934); M. CHIRLESTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION, f 4.01, at 56-58 (2d ed 1979); 3A J. MERTENS, supra note 46, at§ 21.48, at 130 n.J. 
56. See S. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in (1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 5689, 5703 (''The Committee sees no reason for giving donors any more gift tax 
deferral than is accorded taxpayers generally.") (discussing amendment requiring payment of 
gift tax on a quarterly basis); 79 CoNo REc. 12,302 (1935) (statement of Rep. Cooper) ("tax 
. . . is levied on donor''); Proposed Increase in Federal Tax: Hearings on R.R. 671 S Before tlze 
Senate Committee on Finance, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1924) (statement of Secretary of Treas-
ury Mellon) ("unlike any other tax that I know of - the one who gives pays the tax, and not 
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however, the sponsor of the gift tax amendment that eventually be-
came law stated that "[i]t is immaterial whether the donor or the 
donee pays it."57 
The Eighth Circuit's part-sale, part-gift theory, while consistent 
with section 2502(c)'s language, undermines Congress' preferential 
treatment of gifts by forcing donors to realize gain on their transfers. 
Family or other units do receive economic benefits when the donee 
pays the gift tax,58 but Congress has sanctioned the receipt of such 
benefits; it allows the donor to decide both who realizes gain from 
the one who receives"), reprinted in 4 LAW, REPORTS, MlscELLANY 61 (Revenue Act of 1924) 
(Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law Library); 65 CONG. REc. 3173 
(1924) (statement of Rep. Mills) (''Why do you impose a tax on the donor?"). President 
Roosevelt proposed a succession, inheritance, and legacy tax in 1935. The bill containing the 
proposal stated that the tax was "in addition to the gift tax on the donors." H.R. 8974, 74th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1935), reprinted in 16 BILL IN ITS VARIOUS FORMS 59 (Revenue Act of 1935) 
(Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law Library); cf. H.R. REP. No. 1681, 
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935), reprinted in 9 LAW, REPoRTS, MlsCELLANY 10 (Revenue Act of 
1935) (bill imposes tax ''upon the right to receive property by gift") (Carlton Fox Collection of 
the University of Michigan Law Library). 
Apparently, all commentators also assumed that the donor would pay the gift tax. See., 
e.g., A.L.I., FEDERAL GIFr & EsTATE TAXATION RECOMMENDATIONS 89 (1969); Alexander, 
Federal Estate & G!ft Taxation: Tlte Major Issues in the American Law Institute Project, 22 
TAX L. REv. 635, 651 (1967); Faber, supra note 3, at 1234 (''the law ... has developed on the 
assumption that the gift tax liability is that of the donor''); Miller, Tlte Federal G!ft Tax: Rate 
Revision, 51 A.B.A. J. 333, 333 (1965). 
57. MR. MILLS. As a matter of information who is to pay the tax? 
MR. GREEN of Iowa. The amendment does not specifically provide who is to pay 
the tax, but the bill provides that one shall be paid, and under the general provisions 
of estate taxes the tax would be a lien upon the amount of the gift. The Tax, follow-
ing the ordinary procedure, would be paid by the man who makes the gift. As a 
matter of fact, I assume it would be taken out of the gift and paid by the party who 
receives it 
MR. MILLS. The gentleman said that the man who receives the gift should pay on 
it It is not clear, because now the gentleman says the donor will pay the tax. 
MR. GREEN of Iowa~ I did not say who should pay it 
MR. MILLS. Surely the gentleman has not introduced an amendment so indefinite 
that he can not say whether the donor or the donee will pay the tax? 
MR. GREEN of Iowa. Oh, the donor will have to pay the tax if it is not paid by the 
donee. 
MR. LONGWORTH. I am in the same situation as the gentleman from New York 
[Mr. MILLS] seems to be. Suppose the gift were real estate. Who would pay the tax 
in that case, and what would it be? 
MR. GREEN of Iowa. It would be paid by the donor if the donee does not pay it I 
would think the donee would be content to pay it 
MR. GREEN of Iowa. It is immaterial whether the donor or the donee pays it The 
Government will get the money in any event; but the donor is responsible under the 
amendment, for the reason that it is drawn to correspond with the estate tax. There 
is no reason why the donor should not If a man keeps the property until the time of 
the death of the decedent, his estate would have to pay it These large gifts are made 
in a large number of cases for the purpose of evading the tax, and they would have 
the effect of defeating the tax imposed on an estate. 
65 CONG. REc. 3120 (1924). . 
58. See text at notes 23-24 supra. 
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the transfer of appreciated property59 and when that gain will be 
realized. Most donors make the first decision by comparing their 
tax rates with the rates of their donees: 
If the donee's tax rate is lower than the donor's, the property can be 
transferred in kind and then sold by the donee at a lower tax cost than 
the donor would incur. If the donor's tax rate is lower than the do-
nee's, the property can be sold in advance of the gift and the cash pro-
ceeds transferred net of tax. 60 
Similarly, the donor can either sell the property and give cash or 
simply transfer the property depending on when it is most advanta-
geous to realize gain. 
Congress' intent to allow donors to transfer property without re-
alizing gain is strikingly evinced in the recaptui:e provisions, sections 
1245 and 1250.61 Section 1245, which basically applies to deprecia-
ble personal property, seeks to prevent taxpayers from converting 
ordinary income into capital gains by first taking depreciation de-
ductions to offset ordinary income and then obtaining capital gains 
tax rates on the amount realized when the property is sold. 62 Sub-
ject to certain exceptions, section 1250 applies the same principle to 
depreciable realty when depreciation deductions exceed straight line 
depreciation for property disposed of within ten years.63 Sections 
1245(b)(l) and 1250(d)(l), however, exempt donative transfers from 
the recapture of depreciation provisions. 64 The House Report on 
section 1250 explained: "The effect . . . is to treat the donor and 
donee for purposes of this provision as if they were one person. 
"65 
Because the part-sale, part-gift theory forces donors to realize 
59. See M. CHlRELSTEIN, supra note 55, at 54-57; cf. Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1928) 
(donee taxed on appreciation that took place while donor held property); Rice v. Eisner, 16 
F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 764 (1927) (same). 
60. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 55, at 56-57. 
61. I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250. 
62. See S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 707, 801. 
63. See S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 131-32, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG, 
& AD. NEWS 1673, 1805-06. For a survey of the immediate response to these provisions, sec 
Horvitz, Sections 1250 & 1245: Tlte Puddle & Tlte Lake, 20 TAX L. REv. 285 (1965); Kcrcstcr & 
Katcher, Gain from .Dispositions of Certain .Depreciable Property- Section 1245 of tlte Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954, 15 W. REs. L. REv. 281 (1964); Ruffner, Gain from .Dispositions of 
Certain .Depreciable Property- Section 1245, 17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 619 (1963); Shapiro, Re-
capture of .Depreciation & Section 1245 of tlte Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L. J. 1483 (1963); 
Comment, .Depreciation Recapture - Sections 1245 and 1250 of tlte Internal Revenue Code of 
1954, 37 U. COLO, L. REV. 469 (1965). 
64. I.R.C. §§ 1245(b)(l), 1250(d)(l). See H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Scss. 67 
(1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 471 ("no gain is recognized at the time of disposition. • • • the 
ordinary income potential ••. carries over into the hands of the donce."); S. REP. No. 1881, 
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 707, 803 (''the depreciation deductions 
of the donor must be taken into account by the donce, and may result in ordinary income to 
him if he sells the property."). 
65. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 105, reprinted in [1964) U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 1313, 1413-14. 
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gain when they transfer appreciated property, 66 it flies in the face of 
Congress' desire to ensure that gifts would not create income tax lia-
bilities for donors. It does this, moreover, even though the purposes 
of the gift tax are fulfilled without making donors realize gain. The 
gift tax supplements the income and estate taxes.67 It is intended, 
first, to prevent donors from avoiding estate taxes by making inter 
vivas gifts68 and, second, to prevent donors from ~voiding income 
taxes by splitting income among family members or trusts.69 
By virtue of its supplementary role, the gift tax assumes the pur-
poses of the estate and income taxes. The primary functions of the 
estate tax include preventing undue accumulations of wealth, 70 tax-
The first exemption is for gifts. Thus, the making of a gift for this purpose will not be 
a taxable event. However, the depreciation deductions of the donor in such a case are 
carried over to the donee. If the donee subsequently sells the real property, there may be 
ordinary income recognized by him as a result of depreciation deductions taken by the 
donor. The donee, ii:1. such a case, however, will receive the benefit of the holding period 
of the donor. The effect, therefore, of this if to treat the donor and donee far purposes of the 
provision as !f they were one person with the result that upon subsequent sale by the donee 
of the property, the same amount (if any) will be treated as ordinary income as if the 
donor held the property throughout the entire period. 
Id. (emphasis added); see S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 135, reprinted in [1964] U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1809. · 
66. See Brief for the Respondent at 8-9, 11-19, Diedrich v. Commissioner, cert. granted, 
102 S. Ct. 89 (1981) (No. 80-2204). · 
61. See, e.g., Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939) ("gift tax is supple-
mentary to the estate tax"); H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1932), reprinted in 1939-
1 C.B. 477 ("gift tax will supplement both the estate tax and income tax"); Harriss, Legislative 
Hiftory of Federal G!ft Taxation, 18 TAXES 531, 538 (1940). 
68. See, e.g., Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 333 (1932) (Stone, 1,, dissenting) ("to pre-
vent or compensate for the withdrawal of property·by gifts inter vivos from operation of the 
estate tax"); W. SHULTZ & C. HARRiss, AMERICAN PuBuc FINANCE 452 (6th ed. 1954); Alex-
ander, sup,:a note 56, at 637; H~ supra note 67, at 538; Magill, The Federal G!ft Tax, 40 
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 773 (1940). 
69. See Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 47 (1939) (e.g., "compensate for 
the loss of surtax upon income"); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1932), reprinted in 
1939-1 C.B. 504; W. SHULTZ & C. HARRiss, supra note 68, at 452. 
The American Law Institute presents the most comprehensive list of objectives: 
(1) to produce revenue; 
(2) to unpose reasonable restrictions on the inheritance of wealth; 
(3) to guard against the destruction of incentives to accumulate wealth; 
(4) to reduce, if not eliminate, the circumstances under which the form of transfer will 
affect the tax result; 
(5) to have a tax system that is readily understandable in normal and routine transfer 
situations; · · 
(6) to treat taxpayers similarly situated in the same manner; and 
(1) to produce a tax structure that will be regarded as fair. 
READINGS IN DEATH & GIFr TAX.REFORM I (G. Goldstein ed. 1971) (citing ALI, RECOM-
MENDATIONS ON EsTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 78 (1969)). 
70. See, e.g., Bloch, Economic Objectives of Gratuitous Tranefer Taxation, 4 NATL. TAX. J. 
139, 140 (1951); Casner,American Law Institute Federal Estate & G!ft Tax Project, 22 TAX. L. 
REv. 515, 518 (1967); Dodge, supra note 53, at 1189; Klein, supra note 53, at 239-40. Some 
commentators emphasize decreasing concentrations of wealth. See C. SHOUP, FEDERAL Es-
TATE AND GIFr TAXES 100-01, 128 (1966) (anti-concentration) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL 
EsTATE AND GIFr TAXES]; C. SHOUP, supra note 43, at 372; Klein, supra note 53, at 231-40; 
Kurtz & Surrey, Reform of Death and G!ft Taxes: The 1969 Treasury Proposals, The Criticism 
and a Rebuttal, 70 CoLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1367 (1970). 
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ing property once a generation, 71 and trucing windfalls to the recipi-
ent. 72 When the donee pays the gift tax, these purposes are satisfied 
even though the donor does not recognize gain. The gift tax is also 
designed to reduce that loss of income tax revenue that accompanies 
gifts. 73 The attainment of this goal is similarly unaffected by the 
source of the gift tax payment. Although forcing the donor to recog-
nize gain would marginally increase income tax receipts, 74 it does so 
only by undermining other important goals. 75 
Despite the inconsistency of the part-sale, part-gift theory and 
71. See, e.g., FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFr TAXES, supra note 70, at 100-01; Kurtz & Surrey, 
supra note 70, at 1367. 
12. See, e.g., B. BITTKER. & L. STONE, supra note 43, at 984; FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT 
TAXES, supra note 70, at 100-01; Casner, supra note 70, at 518; Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 70, 
at 1367. 
73. When the donee receives a gift of property the government can lose revenue in four 
ways. First, the income tax on the donee's subsequent sale of the property will be less than if 
the donor sold the property because donors are usually in higher tax brackets than donees. 
See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text. A second loss of income ta,ces arises if the 
property continually produces income, because that income is taxed at the donee's lower rate. 
Third, these income tax losses are increased when the donor divides property among many 
donees who are all in a lower tax bracket than the donor. The final loss of income to the 
government results from the loss of the time value of the income tax the donor would have 
paid had he sold the property. 
Congress reenacted the gift tax in 1932 to compensate for these revenue losses: "[The gift 
tax] will tend to reduce the incentive to make gifts in order that distribution of future income 
from the donated property may be to a number of persons with the result that the ta,ces im-
posed by the higher brackets of the income tax law are avoided," H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 477; accord, Estate of Sanford v. Commis-
sioner, 308 U.S. 39, 47 (1939) ("compensate for loss of surtax upon income"); Smith v. Shaugh-
nessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 n.1 (''prevent income tax avoidance .•. through ••. escaping the 
effect of progressive surtax rates" (citations omitted)); Harriss, supra note 67, at 534 ("gift ta,c 
. . . should have rates . • . high enough to protect the surtaxes"); Magill, supra note 68, at 
773. 
74. The part-sale, part-gift theory might even cause I} decrease in ta,c revenues. The the-
ory's realization requirement forces donors to realize gain regardless of how the transaction is 
structured. As a consequence, a donor may choose to hold property until he has sufficient 
capital losses to minimize the tax impact of the gift. The donor may well hold the property 
until death. In the former situation, the government loses the time value of the gift ta,c and 
income tax; in the latter situation, the loss of gift tax revenue is compensated for by the estate 
tax, but the government loses income tax revenue because the appreciated value of the prop-
erty escapes taxation when the heirs receive a stepped up basis in the property. Thus, the part-
sale, part-gift theory's realization requirement may produce a "lock-in" effect similar to that 
caused by § 1014, which could cause a loss in total tax revenues. 
75. Incentives for gift giving, see note 52 supra, are justified on several policy·grounds. 
The first is that incentives are needed to encourage the transfer of society's productive assets to 
a younger generation at an earlier date, which will, in turn, produce a more aggressive, dy-
namic economic system. See Alexander, supra note 56, at 645; Jantscher, .Death and Gift Taxa-
tion in the United Stales After the Report of the Royal Commission, 22 NATL. TAX J. 121, 129 
(1969); Miller, supra note 56, at 333-36. A second reason, which was advanced for excluding 
the gift tax from the tax base, is that the "omission •.. [is] a partial offset to the disadvantage 
of paying a tax at an earlier date than if the transfer had been postponed to death." FEDERAL 
ESTATE AND GIFr TAXES, supra note 70, at 127; cf. Jantschner, supra, at 129-30 (criticizing the 
above argument when it is made in favor of separate rate structures, but later accepting the 
concept of incentives so long as there is a single progessive tax system). The third explanation, 
which is a corollary to the second reason given above, is that the government may be willing to 
discount gift taxes in order to increase revenues at an earlier date. See Harriss, supra note 67, 
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congressional policy, the current Code requires courts to apply that 
theory.76 But Congress can act to make the income tax consequences 
of donees' gift tax payments consistent with its overall policy toward 
gifts.77 In particular, Congress should amend the Code to make the 
gift tax a shared obligation of the donor and donee, so that neither 
party would realize income when the other pays the tax.78 This solu-
at 538 (suggesting that this was one of the original reasons for establishing gift giving 
incentives). 
76. It is well established that in tax cases, the Code's provisions are given their plain mean-
ing if they are unambiguous. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I, 6 (1947) ("interpret 
[words] in their ordinary, everyday senses" (citation omitted)); McFeely v. Commissioner, 296 
U.S. 102, 111 (1935); Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 109, 113 (1933) (''if [tax is imposed] in 
plain words, as it [is] here, the courts are not at liberty to modify the act by construction in 
order to avoid special hardship"); Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1931) 
(plain meaning preferred); United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931) (apply literal mean-
ing unless result absurd); Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1930) (rule of strict con-
struction applies with special force to tax statutes); Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on 
Tax Administration, 58 HAR.v. L. REv. 477,521,522 (1945) (solution to statutory interpretation 
must come under words of statute). Contra, Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HAR.v. L. REv. 
863 (1930). See also, Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate .Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950) (suggesting that 
for every rule of statutory construction there is corollary that reaches the opposite result). 
77. See Note, Inheritance, Estate and Gift Taxes- Gift Tax -Income Tax-Tlze .Donor 
of a Gift Made Subject to tlte Condition that tlte .Donee Pay State and Federal Gift Taxes on tlte 
Transfer Does Not Realize Taxable Income Even Though Gift Taxes Paid Exceed tlte Property's 
At{fttsted Basis. - Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (en bane), 47 U. CIN. L. 
REv. 341, 347-48 (1978) (criticizing Hirst court for usurping legislative prerogative to establish 
tax policies by providing donor with nonrecognition of gain). But see Cornell Note, supra note 
IO, at 1085-86 (nonrecognition of donor's gain should not be allowed because "objections to 
taxation of appreciation at the time of a net gift do not outweigh the benefits achieved in the 
form of equal and fair administration of the income tax system"). 
78. The Regulations currently call for an increase in the donee's basis regardless of who 
pays the gift tax. Treas. Reg.§ l.1015-5(b)(2) (1964) ("It is immaterial whether the gift tax is 
paid by the donor or the donee."). The Treasury was following Congress' intent when it 
promulgated the regulation. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 199, reprinted in [1958) 
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NE.Ws 4791, 4988 (''It is immaterial whether the gift tax is paid by the 
donor or donee."). Congress wanted to increase the basis to avoid double taxation: 
In this case the "cost" is the cost of the property to the donor, adjusted for any subsequent 
depreciation, etc. However, this ignores the fact that in reality there is another "cost" 
incurred in transferring the property from the donor to the donee; namely, the gift tax, 
which must be paid in order to make this transfer. 
S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 70, reprinted in [1958) U.S. CoDE.·CONG. & AD NEWS 
4791, 4859. See Groh, New Basis far Property Acquired by Gift, 37 TAXES 545 (1959) (stating 
that§ 1015(d)(l)(B) remedies the "inequity" that results when the donee pays the gift tax and 
no adjustment is allowed). 
In 1976, Congress reduced the amount of the basis increase to that percentage of the gift 
tax attributable to the appreciation of the property's value in the hands of the donor. See Tax 
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005(c), 90 Stat. 1520, 1877 (1976) (codified at 
I.R.C. § 1015(a)(6)). Congress enacted this limitation because, under prior law, the basis in-
crease included the amount of the gift tax payment attributable to the donor's original basis in 
the property. Double taxation, the concern that prompted adoption of the provision allowing 
a basis increase for the gift tax payment, only affected the appreciated value of the gift. Thus, 
Congress limited the basis increase to that amount. See JOINT COMMlTI'E.E. ON TAXATION, 
supra note 52, at 561, 1976-3 C.B. at 573; H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 44, re-
printed in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, 3398. This Note's solution would not 
doubly tax the same appreciation. The donee's basis would still be increased to reflect the 
orginal gift tax payment. 
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tion would reconcile congressional policy and the language of the 
Code. 
Although one could object that the proposed amendment pro-
duces a windfall to donors, this argument is unpersuasive. Even 
though· the donor's supposed gain escapes taxation, the gift tax is 
paid. The amendment reduces only the potential income tax liability 
that arises from having to sell part of an appreciated asset to pay the 
gift tax. But the possibility of such a reduction inheres in a single 
unit analysis, and Congress has been willing to forgo income tax rev-
enue in other contexts to preserve single unit treatment for donors 
and donees. 79 
CONCLUSION 
J)iedrich v. Commissioner80 poses a dilemma that only Congress 
should resolve. Section 2502(c) requires donors to pay gift taxes, and 
the Supreme Court's decision in Old Colony Trust suggests that do-
nors incur taxable gain when their donees pay those taxes. The con-
clusions logically demanded of the Court in J)iedrich - that the 
part-sale, part-gift theory applies and that the donors hav~ received 
taxable gains to the extent that their donees' gift tax payments have 
exceeded their adjusted bases - are inconsistent with Congress' 
present tax treatment of gifts. But the tax law is not properly sub-
jected Jo judicial activism, and the Court should, therefore, leave it 
to Congress to reconcile its policies with the Code's language. 
19. See text at notes 53-55, 61-65 supra. 
80. 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 (1981) (No. 80-2204). 
